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A b s t r a c t :  In 2009, when the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program was introduced, there 
was a specific modality contained within its portfolio, which was to be executed by non-profit entities. 
However, because it was known from the very start that this program had been proposed and structured 
by those from within the civil construction industry, we decided to undertake an investigation, which 
could explain the emergence of a modality called Entidades, together with its scope. The present article 
analyzes and discusses the importance of the advent of this modality, seeking to problematize it from the 
viewpoint of the insertion and access of a specific group: the social housing movements. The analysis has 
been based on the literature, legislation and documentation regarding the program, as well as interviews 
with leaders and empirical research into projects under construction in the city of São Paulo and the 
metropolitan region.
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R e s u m o :  Já em 2009, ano do lançamento do Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida, havia em 
seu portfólio uma modalidade específica para ser executada por entidades sem fins de lucro. No entanto, 
sabendo-se que o Programa foi proposto e estruturado, desde sua origem, por atores do setor da construção 
civil, empreendemos investigação que nos explicasse o surgimento da modalidade Entidades em seu escopo. O 
artigo analisa e discute a importância do advento dessa modalidade, buscando problematizá-la do ponto de 
vista da inserção e do acesso de um grupo específico: os Movimentos Sociais de Moradia. A análise baseia-se 
em literatura sobre o tema, legislação e documentação sobre o Programa, entrevistas com lideranças e pesquisa 
empírica em empreendimentos em obra ou em projeto na cidade de São Paulo e sua região metropolitana.
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INTRODUCTION
The Minha Casa Minha Vida Program (My Home, My Life – also commonly 
known in its abbreviated form as PMCMV) is the first major program to provide 
housing at a federal level since the period of the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), 
during which around four million homes were built by the now extinct National 
Housing Bank (BNH).
Substantial public resources are available for financing at all levels (Income 
Groups 1, 2 and 3)1 with significant benefits for the priority group (Group 1), using 
funds from the Federal Budget. For these unprecedented aspects alone, the program 
justly deserves to be widely studied, debated and assessed. Moreover, for these reasons 
and beyond, there are other elements that also deem it worthy of attention: during its 
two phases2, the program aimed to build a total of three million housing units, and 
its third phase was launched on 30/3/2016 with a building target of 2 million homes, 
and Bill 4960/2016 is pending in Congress. However, given Brazil’s deep ongoing 
political and economic instability, it is impossible to know if the new phase will ever 
actually take effect3.  
At the time, the government’s official justification for introducing the program 
was the 2008 financial crisis, which began in the US and originated in real estate 
sector. There was a fear that Brazil would feel the effects of this crisis, hence the need 
to create a countercyclical program. In other words, this would be a program that 
would operate in the opposite direction to the crisis. 
While the Brazilian macroeconomic environment in 2009 was moderately 
favorable, a real estate program would be suitable for this purpose, since it would 
provide a boost to the construction industry, stimulate the economy and create jobs. 
Furthermore, it would also reduce the housing shortage in the country, which stood 
at around seven million housing units, according to the João Pinheiro Foundation.
Nonetheless, much criticism4 was levelled at the program: the private sector 
draining substantial public funds and similarly the privatized nature of production 
with no social control; non adhering to the housing shortage within the priority 
group; detachment from the architecture as proposed by the program and the ongoing 
discussions within the National Housing Plan (in preparation for its introduction); 
the absence of a land policy contained within its guidelines; the questionable quality 
of the housing and a fear that the produced projects located on the peripheries would 
tend to aggravate the socio-spatial segregation within cities (repeating the pattern of 
past housing programs); and the fact of being interpreted more as a funding program 
rather than a housing program stricto sensu.  
Given this particular context and the well-grounded criticisms, we went 
in search of inspiration5 and support of the program in order to understand its 
institutional design and consequently, its operation. We then turned to the literature 
so as to obtain a better understanding of this program as a form of consoliding 
Brazil’s financialization of its housing policy (in a very particular manner)6, a process 
already observed in other Latin American countries, which, in turn, reflected the 
financialization of the world’s economy (in general) 7.
This article8 deals with the improbable incursion of a specific modality in the 
program destined for non-profit entities, in a conjuncture so impermeable to them, 
considering all the previously raised aspects. The hypothesis initially outlined was 
1 In Phase I of the Program, 
the Income Groups were de-
termined in acordance with 
the minimum salary (up to 
3, 6 and 10), while in Phase II 
they were defined with pre-
fixed nominal values (up to 
R$1,600.00; R$ 3,275.00; and 
R$ 5.000,00). For more infor-
mation see the Program Man-
ual (Cartilhas e Manuais do 
Programa), in the References.
2 Phase I began in 2009, dur-
ing the 2nd term of Luís Inácio 
Lula da Silva as President, 
with the aim of building 1 
million housing units (Feder-
al Bill nº 11.977 on 7/7/2009), 
and Phase 2 began in 2011, 
during the 1st  term of Dilma 
Rousseff as President, with 
the aim of building 2 million 
housing units (Federal Bill nº 
12.424 on 16/6/2011).
3 On 6/5/2016, 13 thousand 
units were contracted by 
Minha Casa Minha Vida Enti-
dades throughout the entire 
country. Days after, there 
was talk of repealing the 
law enabling the contracts. 
On 20/5/2016 the press an-
nounced the suspension of 
the Minha Casa Minha Vida 
Program. However, on the 
same day, the Ministry of Cit-
ies denied this information. 
4 Arantes and Fix (2009); 
Maricato (2009); Rolnik 
and Nakano (2009); Rolnik 
(2010).
5 When we conducted a 
doctorate internship under 
the supervision of Prof. Dr. 
Emílio Pradilla Cobos, at 
the Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana-Xochimil-
co/Mexico, in 2013. This 
internship was financed by 
the Fundação de Amparo à 
Pesquisa do Estado de São 
Paulo (FAPESP).
6 Royer (2009); Shimbo 
(2010); Fix (2011).
7 Harvey (1989); Chesnais 
(2005).
8 This text synthesizes the 
main issues discussed in the 
doctorate thesis developed 
by the author. The research 
received financial support 
from the Fundação de Am-
paro à Pesquisa do Estado 
de São Paulo (FAPESP).
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that the social housing movements would not be inserted into the Minha Casa 
Minha Vida Program, since it was created unmindful of the National Housing Plan, 
in the midst of the National Housing Policy, a topic which this group and other 
sectors from civil society had discussed untiringly for decades. However, when we 
became aware of a specific modality, which was to be executed by this segment in 
its portfolio, this hypothesis became invalidated, and it therefore fell upon us to 
understand just how this modality had been developed and how it operated. 
By analysing projects either under construction or in the planning stages, in the 
city of São Paulo and the metropolitan region, together with other aspects raised in 
the current literature, the legislation which established the modality, the dialogue 
with the social movement leaders, and the follow up at public debates, enabled the 
Entidades modality to be seen as a set of adaptations of previous federal housing 
programs and of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program itself in its modalty as a type 
of service to Group 1 operated by FAR9. It may also be concluded that its existence 
does not necessarily ensure favorable conditions for the social movements, which 
fought for its creation, to access the program. We have been able to verify that from 
its origins through to its execution, the modality was never a consensual process, 
given the significant differences between this and other modalities in the program; 
either with regard to its objectives, allocation of resources, treatment in the different 
institutional spheres and in its execution and operation. 
The article is divided into three sections: the first deals with the political aspects 
of inserting this modality into the program; in the second, we assess the practical 
aspects of the social housing movements’ access to it; and finally, in the third 
part, we present the empirical aspects of the research that, together with the other 
aspects raised, assist in discussing the possible gains brought by the modality and its 
improvement.
INSERTION – THE EMERGENCE 
OF THE ENTIDADES MODALITy IN 
THE MINHA CASA MINHA VIDA PROGRAM: 
SOCIAL HOUSING MOVEMENTS CALL 
FOR THE ANNOUNCED GOAL
In order to understand the Entidades (Entities) modality it is necessary to focus 
on the context in which Minha Casa Minha Vida was created. However, before 
that, it is important to understand the history of federal housing policies: legacies, 
accumulations, inspirations, institutional supports; since this would be the only 
manner with which to move forward on the following questions:
Since this is not a housing program under the auspices of the National Housing 
Plan, but rather a financing program with financialization characteristics, how is it 
then possible to establish a modality within its structure intended for non-profit? 
Assuming that there was no place for the social housing movements in the Minha 
Casa Minha Vida Program, why were their agendas incorporated so as to create the 
Entidades modality? What role did this group play in its creation? Did the institution 
of this modality automatically signify that the social movements would have access 
9 The Residential Leasing 
Fund. This modalidility is 
commonly referred to as 
“PMCMV Construction 
Company”, or “PMCMV 
Enterprise”. 
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to the Program? How did they participate in its operationalization? The following 
section briefly addresses the main issues. 
The Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program10 (often abbreviated as 
PMCMV-E) was not formed concurrently with the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program. 
On the contrary, it came into being through direct pressure from National Entities in the 
Fight for Housing11 with the goal of building 1 million homes under self-management 
schemes. In other words, it was formulated after Minha Casa Minha Vida12. 
Our talks with leaders from the four national entities13 revealed that shortly 
before the program was launched, a group of representatives was invited to Brasilia 
to be formally “presented” to the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program, which was 
considered “ready”. Some of the leaders registered their surprise at the announcement 
of this proposal since it was not the one that had been agreed under PlanHab 
(discussions for which took place prior to developing the Program). Consequently, 
there were some late talks with other sectors of civil society, after proposals for the 
Program had been formatted by the Civil House and the Ministry of Finance14, 
entrepreneurs from the construction industry and representatives from the real estate 
sector (CARDOSO; ARAGÃO, 2013;. RIZEK et al, 2015).
While the leaders recognized that the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades was 
only created in order to meet their demands, at the same time they also admitted 
that the then President Lula and Ministers Dilma Rousseff and Guido Mantega, 
representatives of a “progressive” government, and who were leading negotiations at 
the time, were sympathetic to their appeals.
However, although Minha Casa Minha Vida was an unprecedented program, 
(as discussed in the Introduction) it was not exactly viewed as an innovation by 
some of these same leaders. They described the initial ideas15 of PMCMV as being 
part of a historical process spanning three decades, of which the most productive 
developments had been expressed in the SNHIS/FNHIS16 within the bounds of the 
National Housing Policy and the National Housing Plan. However, the reservations 
and criticisms with which it was met pronounced the program as a “U-turn.”
According to Shimbo (2010, p. 93, author’s translation), the program was not 
only interpreted as “nothing new”, but rather as something “obvious”, predictable, 
especially given the ongoing conjunctures in the country, especially in the economic 
and regulatory environments. 
Similarly, the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program was also not construed 
as unprecedented, instead some leaders considered it an improved version of the 
Crédito Solidário Program (CSP), which preceded it. This opinion is also shared by 
such authors as Cardoso, Aragão and Araújo (2011) and Lago (2011). 
As a proposal that came after the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program, the 
Entidades modality was not drawn up in partnership with the concerns expressed 
by the national entities. It made more sense not only to capitalize on the “heat of 
the moment” brought by the launch, but also on a federal government program as a 
“bearing”. Thus, the PMCMV-E was created and established as a genuine, although 
not explicit, reference to the Crédito Solidário Program (the only federal government 
program that had hitherto been exclusively for non-profit associations and entities).
There is generally a consensus among leaders of the national entities in the fight 
for housing relating to the development of self-management programs in the federal 
government, of which the Crédito Solidário Program was a reference point. Although it 
10 This modality was offi-
cially called the Habitacional 
Popular Entidades – Minha 
Casa Minha Vida Program, 
in accordance with Resolu-
tion nº 141 on 10/6/2009. 
The present article adopts 
the nomenclature Minha 
Casa Minha Vida Entidades 
Program. 
11 CONAM (The National 
Confederation of Residents 
Associations), CMP (Central 
Social Movements), UNMP 
(Nacional Union of Social 
Housing), MNLM (National 
Movement in the Fight for 
Housing). 
12 The PMCMV was initial-
ly created through Provi-
sional Measure nº 459 on 
25/3/2009 (Converted into 
Law 11.977 on 7/7/2009) 
and the PMCMV-E was cre-
ated by Resolution nº 141, 
on 10/06/2009, by the Trus-
tee Council of the Social De-
velopment Fund.
13 These were selected for 
the research due to their 
past participation in debates 
favouring the creation of a 
federal public housing poli-
cy, for being on the National 
Council of Cities, and for be-
ing based and working in the 
city of São Paulo.
14 And not by the Ministry 
of Cities, as we would sup-
pose.
15 Ideas regarding the pro-
posal and not the operation, 
which it later took on.
16 The National Social 
Housing System/The 
National Social Housing 
Fund.
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was always well-regarded for the manner in which it was modelled, it was nonetheless 
fragile in terms of resource allocation, which therefore justified the emphasis on the 
increased supply of resources for the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program, as 
well as the facility to access them. Another significant difference is the fact that the 
CSP was only one form of funding, while in the PMCMV-E, besides the financing, 
there were also numerous subsidies.
In both programs, the source of funding came from the FDS17. However, “The 
CSP is able to use deposits from the FDS, and the PMCMV-E is based on resources 
from the National General Budget transferred to the FDS through Law 11.977 / 
2009” (MINEIRO; RODRIGUES, 2012, p. 30, author’s translation). This is the 
same law that instituted the PMCMV, and this addendum is important because, 
as we have demonstrated, although the PMCMV-E was guided by the CSP, other 
incorporated rules are seated in the PMCMV. In other words, the PMCMV-E is 
a “hybrid” program between the Crédito Solidário Program and the Minha Casa 
Minha Vida Program.
In terms of mortgages, in the CSP, monthly payments were calculated based on 
the full amount of the mortgage, while the PMCMV-E considers the ability of the 
beneficiary families to pay. Furthermore, Resolution Nº 194 on 12/12/2012 adjusted 
the net value of the initial monthly payment from 10% to 5% of the gross monthly 
family income. The other possibility is a fixed minimum value, which changed from 
R$ 50.00 to R$ 25.00.
Created as an adaptation of the CSP18 within the context of creating the 
PMCMV, the PMCMV-E in practice has encountered a number of obstacles in being 
implemented.
I’ll tell you one thing. The Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program was bad from 
birth. The problem goes right back to its origins, because its structure was based on the 
development programs of the Caixa Econômica Federal. And how do federal government 
programs work? They are not intended for associations, entities, which have no prior 
resources. Call it working capital, something like that. And when I say prior, I mean to 
do… to go through all the approval stages that are required today, which you didn’t in 
Erundina’s time19, in this way20 (verbal information).
By broadening the reflection, we could risk stating that it is its very hybridity 
that has made it neither one thing nor the other, but rather a third proposal, a third 
route. This was a “hybrid” program, the success of which was already at risk from 
the beginning, and exactly because of its very self. Conflicts, obstacles and problems 
during its formulation may be encountered in equal proportions during its execution, 
in fact, one arose from the other.  
Another aspect related to the origin of PMCMV-E concerns the amount of 
resources it was allocated, which were proportional to the construction targets that 
it was set and, for this same reason, were much lower than those directed to the 
PMCMV.
In Article 18 of Law nº 12,424/2011 (which established the second phase of the 
program), which amended certain aspects of Law nº 11,977/2009 (which instituted 
the first), the allocation of resources is thus mentioned:
17 The Social Development 
Fund.
18 According to Rodri-
gues (2013), the Crédito 
Solidário Program is an ad-
aptation of federal financ-
ing programs for the states 
and municipalities.
19 Referring to the experien-
ces of self-management in 
the city of São Paulo towards 
the end of the 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s, 
during Luiza Erundina’s ad-
ministration.
20 Luciana Royer – An inter-
view given on 2/2013. Lucia-
na Royer is currently a pro-
fessor at the Faculdade de 
Arquitetura e Urbanismo da 
Universidade de São Paulo. 
At the time of the interview 
however she was inter-
viewed as the Coordinator 
(contracted) of Technical 
Assistance and Special Man-
agement Programs for the 
Management of Urban and 
Rural Development in São 
Paulo – Caixa Econômica 
Federal.
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The Union is authorized to transfer funds to the Residential Leasing Fund - FAR, to 
the limit of R$16,500,000,000.00 (sixteen billion, five hundred million Reals), and to 
the Social Development Fund - FDS, to the limit of R$500,000,000.00 (five hundred 
million Reals).
Pedro Arantes and Mariana Fix (2009), comment on the model of program at 
the time of its launch.
 
A total of 97% of public subsidies provided by the housing package, with resources from 
the Union and FGTS, are passed on for the supply and direct production of private 
construction companies, and only 3% to non-profit entities, cooperatives and social 
movements for the production of urban and rural housing through self-management 
(ARANTES; FIX, 2009, p. 2, author’s translation).
The aim of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program is to provide 
affordable housing for those whose gross monthly income does not exceed R$1,600.00, 
organized into residential or mixed cooperatives, associations and other private 
non-profit entities, aiming at the production and acquisition of new housing. The 
Program referred to these groups generically as Entidades Organizadoras (Organizing 
Entities, which literally acts as an Organizer), whether they were social housing 
movements or private non-profit associations able to prove to the Ministry of Cities 
their capacity to build homes.21  
In other words, within the PMCMV-E every housing movement is an Entidade 
Organizadora, but not every Entidade Organizadora is a housing movement. This 
emphasis is important since for decades, the social housing movements have guided 
and proposed federal housing programs directed towards the priority groups, which 
they themselves have then executed, and have thus demanded part of the declared 
building goal of the PMCMV. However, while this demand was met, it culminated 
in the emergence of a modality that not only serves them, but that also serves other 
different groups in terms of their goals, ideologies, operating practices and public. 
This also signifies that the processes described in this article cannot be generalized to 
other groups, also defined as Entidades Organizadoras. 
The target of 60 thousand units announced for the period 2011/2014 was 
increased in 2014 to 80 thousand units and covers all national urban areas, giving 
priority to beneficiaries who meet the following requirements: female-headed 
households, the disabled, the elderly and socially vulnerable groups.
ACCESS – PROCEDURAL ADJUSTMENTS 
TO MAkE THE MINHA CASA MINHA VIDA 
ENTIDADES PROGRAM OPERABLE  
Through the analysis of laws, decrees, resolutions, normative instructions, 
directives as well as our talks with leaders from the four national organizations, we 
have attempted to identify what we call the “procedural adjustments”, which they 
all proposed, and which were accepted by the Ministry of Cities in order for the 
modality to become operable, and to ensure that the proposals were approved and/
21 A process called Licensing 
the Organizations.
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or contracted quicker. The changes and revisions to the rules and regulations of the 
modality were made possible through countless discussions, meetings, workshops, 
occupations and acts at the Ministry of Cities and Caixa Econômica Federal.  
Below, we analyze three of these adjustments, each of which relates to a specific 
difficulty encountered by these movements in accessing the Minha Casa Minha Vida 
Entidades Program: a) access to land, b) the private logic of housing production, and 
c) the eligibility of families. It should be emphasized that the Federal Government 
has continued to receive proposals for several other adjustments. However, we believe 
that restricting the analysis to just three fulfils with our aim of demonstrating the 
complexity of the relationship between the movements and the official institutional 
framework to operationalize the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program.
One was incorporated into the program’s first phase in 2009, and the other 
two in 2012 in the second phase. This signifies that such procedural adjustments 
were being incorporated while operational. We will present the manner in which 
the problem was defined, the norm that regulated the adjustment, and its “practical” 
aspects. 
Access to Land → Advanced Land Purchase
The problem: One of the characteristics of the PMCMV-E is that adopting the 
selected proposals only occurred after the project design had been prepared, approved 
and licensed. This presupposes two things: 1) that the Entidade Organizadora22 is 
already in possession of the land (either purchased with its own funds or having been 
donated in counterpart by the Municipal Council, for example) and that 2), further 
to this, it possesses working capital in order to cover the development and licensing 
stages of the projects with the relevant bodies. These are impractical requirements, 
both in theory and in practice, since it has always been difficult for the social housing 
movements to capacitate areas for their projects/ventures.
A further contributing factor to the problem of accessing land was the real 
estate boom that occurred in Brazil during the years leading up to the launch of 
the PMCMV. Competing with the construction companies operating in Group 1/
FAR of the PMCMV for land in areas that they had previously neglected, made 
negotiations between the social movements and the landowners even more delicate. 
In other words, between the moment the social housing movements and the land 
owners signed the “purchase and sale option agreement” and the actual moment 
of completing the purchase, many opportunities were lost because the owners had 
passed the land over to the construction companies. 
Also, the sums of money needed to conduct feasibility studies, reports, advice 
and the development of the project itself were beyond their possibilities. And so 
within this context, they requested the Federal Government to use part of the money 
that funded PMCMV-E for the advanced purchase of land, and to pay for technical 
consultants23 to perform all the necessary procedures for legalizing the land deeds, 
feasibility studies and project design.
Adjusting the norm: The operational modality of the PMCMV-E, generically 
baptized by the social housing movements as “Advanced Land Purchase”, was officially 
regulated by Resolution nº 143 on 26/11/2009 with the name “Land acquisition, 
payment for technical assistance and legalization expenses.”
22 Henceforth, we will use 
the term “Entidade Organi-
zadora” in reference to all 
groups that belong to this 
nomenclature within the in-
stitutionalization of the PM-
CMV-E; and “social housing 
movements” in reference 
to the groups whose activi-
ties are directly or indirectly 
linked in the fight for hous-
ing and that were investigat-
ed during our study. 
23 Groups formed through 
nominations by architects, 
but also social workers, 
sociologists and engineers 
to advise the social move-
ments on the development 
of urbanistic and architec-
tural projects. These were 
formed during the 1990s, 
within the context of the 
pioneering experiments 
with social housing projects 
both with collective task 
forces and self-management 
during Luiza Erundina’s gov-
ernment in São Paulo.  
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The practice: Achieving this operational modality was a palliative for the social 
housing movements’ complex problem of land acquisition, and was therefore unable 
to effectively “unlock” the problems of legalizing the target areas of the program. 
Numerous obstacles still persist, mainly because the areas made viable by the social 
housing movements are, logically, those derided by the construction companies. Put 
in another form, land with physical problems (steep slopes, protected areas, springs, 
suspected contamination), faces difficulties in being approved by the licensing bodies, 
and in other cases, land with legal problems face obstacles in being registered with 
the Notary Real Estate Registry.
Furthermore, this modality of the program was also unknown, not only 
throughout the branches of the CEF, but also in the very grassroots of the social 
housing movements themselves24. In order to resolve this issue, leaders from the four 
national entities and the CEF sponsored seminars and workshops so as to spread 
information and aid its operation, particularly in 2012.
In January 2014, Advanced Land Purchase was suspended by the Ministry of 
Cities, arguing that the contractual limits of this operational modality had already 
been reached. Rizek et al. (2014, p. 6) interpreted Advanced Land Purchase as giving 
the entities an advantage. In the specific case of the social housing movements however, 
we do not share this interpretation. We believe that conquering this instrument was 
one of the only real possibilities to access land25, and not an advantage.
Private logic in housing production → PJ/PJ 
The problem: When the Entidades modality was introduced, the mortgage 
agreements were signed individually by the future beneficiary families, while the 
homes were still under construction. The Entidades Organizadoras were only accepted 
and regarded as Organizers (in the broad sense of the term) of the families, and 
were not directly involved in contracting. When there was a need to replace families 
(either because they withdrew or were excluded or the income limit was exceeded), 
matters relating to the individual registration of the property, and in the case of 
replacement - transfer to another family – extra costs were incurred and deadlines 
extended for analysis. Moreover, for the Notary Real Estate Registries, until the 
present day, this has been a totally unprecedented problem. The reason they have 
been unable to solve this problem is most probably because they have always been 
used to dealing with construction companies, developers and the like, who turn 
properties that they will build into “real estate development” and sell them to the 
families. In the case of social housing movements (in which the logic is not the sale 
of ready-built properties), however, the Notaries have not registered the properties 
alleging technical impossibilities, which has eventually overturned the proposals.
Faced with this impasse, the social housing movements proposed that they 
should figure as temporary contractors for the projects, and that these would be signed 
at the end of the construction by the beneficiary families. Thus, the proposals would 
be individualized a posteriori. Hence, the mortgage would be drawn up between 
two legal entities – the Caixa Econômica Federal and the Entidades Organizadoras 
- not between one legal entity (Caixa Econômica Federal) and individuals (future 
beneficiary families).   
Adjusting the norm: This operational modality, commonly known as “PJ/PJ”26 
24 See Rodrigues (2013).
25 Another possibility wou-
ld be land donations from 
municipal, state or federal 
governments.
26 Pessoa Jurídica/Pessoa 
Jurídica – which refers the tax 
status of the legal entities.
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was regulated by Resolution Nº 190 on 7/8/201227 with the name “Direct contracting 
with the Entidade Organizadora as a temporary stand-in for the beneficiaries, linked 
to a future contract with the final beneficiaries”.  
In order for this resolution to be approved, together with calls for the “negotiating 
table”, there were two simultaneous occupations - one at the CEF’s headquarters in 
both São Paulo and in Brasilia on 17/4/2012, and the other at the Ministry of Cities, 
which took place on 7/8/2012 (the exact date on which the resolution was signed and 
published). 
The pratice: Changes to this Resolution have reduced the bureaucracy of the 
projects and provided greater security for families, as well as recognizing the social 
housing movements, not only in acting as representatives of the families, but also as 
agents for the project. 
Eligibility for families → Anticipating family eligibility 
The problem: Resolutions nº 182 and 183 describe three situations in which 
replacement families for contracted projects may be permitted: the interested family 
cancels their purchase, the Entidade Organizadora decides to exclude the family, or 
the income limit is exceeded. With an increase in the national minimum salary over 
recent years, many families initially established as demand28 by the social housing 
movements (before the project contract) were excluded from the process because they 
exceeded the R$1,600.00, which was the limit at the time of making the contract 
with the CEF. The slowness involved in signing the selected proposal contracts 
also contributed to this fact. We believe that this problem is significantly greater 
in the Southeastern and Southern states of the country, where although incomes 
are higher, so is the cost of living. It should be remembered that establishing the 
value of R$1,600.00 as a criterion to access the Program is a national rule. A fixed 
nominal rate of R$1,600.00 instead of three minimum salaries was changed when 
PMCMV-E 2 was launched, within the launch of PMCMV 2, because this amount 
is the criterion for the entire Group 1, whether it is the PMCMV- E operated by the 
FDS, or whether it was the modality of the program operated by FAR.
The social housing movements initially unsuccessfully, called for the return 
of the minimum salary as a reference, suggesting that at least a certain number of 
families would be able to exceed the R$1,600.00 limit by 20%. Thus, a proposal was 
drawn up in order to create an intermediate group, “Group 1¹/²” – situated between 
Group 1 (with a ceiling of R$1,600.00) and Group 2 (with a ceiling of R$ 3,275.00). 
The Federal Government29 argued that maintaining this limit signified that the 
housing shortage would be concentrated into Group 1, and that this ensures that 
the program reaches the families of which it is composed. In the third phase of the 
program, launched on 30/3/2016, in addition to changing the goals, the values  of the 
installments, and the mortgage limits, etc., “Group 1¹/²”, was also included, under 
the following terms:
Art. 2. The operations referred to in Art. 1 are designed to cater for families with a mon-
thly gross income of up to R$1,800.00 (one thousand, eight hundred Reals), allowing 
up to R$ 2,350.00 (two thousand, three hundred and fifty Reals) for up to 10% (ten 
percent) of the families attended by each project [...].30
27 The comments regarding 
this resolution are based 
on the note “What chang-
es with the new Resolution 
from the Ministry of Cities in 
the Minha Casa Minha Vida 
Entidades Program”, drawn 
up by the legal department 
at UMM/SP, available at 
http://www.unmp.org.br. 
Accessed in: August/2012. 
28 The term “demand” 
refers to the applicants 
of the project. We adopt 
this term rather than 
“applicants” because that 
is how they are treated 
by those involved in the 
process.
29 Pronouncement by the 
then Housing Secretary, Inês 
Magalhães, on numerous 
occasions at debates and 
pblic activities regarding this 
theme. 
30 Interministerial Regulation 
Nº 96, from the 30th March 
2016. More information in 
Bill Nº 4960/2016.
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Adjustment of the norm: The social housing movements proposed that families 
should be eliglible for contracted projects while still in the construction stage, and 
so as to ensure their permanence until completion of the project, the criterion for 
replacing families who exceeded the income limits was removed from Resolution nº 
183. This addendum is in Resolutions nº 190, 193 and 194 in the articles regulating 
the operational modality “Contracting the entity as a replacement for future residents 
until the construction is completed, thus ensuring eligibility of the demand”.
The practice: This measure, even being palliative, managed to solve the 
constitutional problem of the social housing movements’ demand. Especially since, 
“losing it” throughout the process, as well as being perverse, considering all the 
political gains achieved by the social housing movements and their grassroots, would 
be a further bureaucratic burden, regarding the procedure of replacing families.
Thusfar, we have seen how the Entidades modiality of the Minha Casa Minha 
Vida Program was directed, suggested, designed and “adjusted”. Moreover, despite 
being passed through a government that was more aligned to the aims of the popular 
movements, its path was nonetheless never peaceful or free from disputes and 
conflicts. Hurdles recognized by the Ministry of Cities:
[...] we are aware that the design of this program increasingly needs to be improved so 
that it is able to face up to the possibilities and difficulties and challenges involved in the 
housing issue... that the social movements produce housing in a country like ours, with 
institutional and legal difficulties is to recognize the actors in civil society who implement 
public policies. It is very clear to us at the Ministry of Cities that the distrust, which exists 
is a misconception. We reaffirm every day that for us the social housing movements are 
not only legitimate actors, but also play a key role for us to implement our housing po-
licy. I think that this, which we’ve proved at every moment, has changed a normative.31 
(Verbal information)
OPERATIONALIzATION AND SPATIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MINHA CASA MINHA 
VIDA ENTIDADES PROGRAM IN SÃO PAULO 
AND METROPOLITAN REGION
During the research, we observed that the construction work contained in most 
of the proposals selected and approved by the Ministry of Cities and the CEF in 2009 
(the year the program was launched) were not initiated before the first half of 201432.
Therefore, analysing contracted projects (whether under construction or not) in 
order to proceed to an empirical analysis did not invalidate our analytical process. 
On the contrary, many more new elements were engendered as we arrived at part of 
the answer to the question we were pursuing: How do the social housing movements 
access the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program?
The number of proposals contracted by the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades 
Program in the state of São Paulo is 44 projects, only 4 of which are not located in the 
city of São Paulo and the metropolitan region. There is one project in the municipality 
of Santos, one in Campinas and two in São João da Boa Vista. The remaining 40 
contracts are concentrated in São Paulo and the metropolitan region.  
31 Inês Magalhães, the then 
Secretary for National Hou-
sing on the occasion of the 
Seminário Programa Minha 
Casa Minha Vida II – with a 
partnership between Fede-
ral and State Governments 
on 6/6/2012 in the Legislativ 
Assembly for the State of 
São Paulo. 
32 An exception was made 
for projects migrating from 
the Crédito Solidário Pro-
gram to the Minha Casa 
Minha Vida Entidades Pro-
gram, for which contruction 
work had either been con-
cluded or was close to con-
struction on the said date.  
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For the purposes of this text, the number of contracts does not necessarily 
signify the equivalent number of developments. This is due to two main reasons: the 
first concerns the two contracting stages, since the first contract implies advanced 
land purchase and the second contract approval of the construction work and the 
consequent release of funds in order to begin, a procedure only made possible once 
all approval stages have been completed by the municipal and state agencies. For 
this reason, the Management Report of the Caixa Econômica Federal (official 
source of data), with a time limit of December 201333, lists all contracts (in the 
two abovementioned stages) until that point, thus presenting us with the task of 
interpreting them so as to measure the number of developments.
Thus, for all 40 projects contracted in São Paulo and the metropolitan area 
(considering these two stages), we have counted 26 developments. In addition, we 
have taken into account the fact that cases with two or more adjoining lots, formed of 
two or more contracts, were seen as the same development when coordinated by the 
same Entidade Organizadora. On the other hand, there are cases with two or more 
lots that are formed of two or more contracts, but which are coordinated by different 
Entidades Organizadoras. These were also interpreted as a single development34.
This detail regarding the limit of houses per project is well defined in the rules 
of the program: 
In the exceptional case of forming a contract with the Entidade Organizadora (non-do-
mestic), it is also possible to authorize: a contract for more than one project by an En-
tidade Organizadora, limited to three (3); and a contract with more than one Entidade 
Organizadora in the same project/proposal, limited to three (3) entities. (CAIXA ECO-
NÔMICA FEDERAL, s/d).
With regard to the links with the four national housing entities, we observed 
from the data analysis that there is a significant number of projects coordinated by 
the social housing movements that have no links with the four national housing 
entities (CONAM, CMP, UNMP and MNLM). 
We analyzed nine developments: one coordinated by a movement afilliated 
to CONAM, one coordinated by a movement afilliated to MNLM and seven 
coordinated by movements afilliated to UNMP.
Other criteria employed during the analysis were: projects in different stages of 
approval and/or construction work, different construction schemes (self-management 
or global construction contract), different types of construction (houses or 
apartments), different locations in the city of São Paulo and different municipalities 
within the metropolitan area. We have also considered the proportion of the financial 
counterparts from other federal entities in the project, as well as the Advanced Land 
Purchase instrument and migration from the Crédito Solidário Program to the Minha 
Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program. 
Of the nine projects analyzed, seven opted for the self-management building 
scheme and two for the global construction contracts. However, it should be 
remembered that self-management is not only restricted to the manner of building. 
Above all, it is the ideology that justifies the existence of the Entidades modality. 
However, our fieldwork has revealed that neither the construction scheme nor the 
ideology are necessarily approved of by the social movements that have opted for them. 
33 In 2014 and 2015 new 
contracts for the PMCMV (all 
Groups) were suspended.
34 When the same plot of 
land was divided into two 
or more lots for technical 
or legal reasons or a part-
nership between Entidades 
Organizadoras.
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For some leaders, the construction scheme and the ideology are extemporaneous, 
since the socio-economic context of this decade is significantly different from that of 
thirty years ago, when projects were only feasible with labour provided by collective 
task forces. 
We have encountered different ways of understanding and embarking on self-
management: some projects are still undertaken with collective task forces (a small 
percentage); in others, self-management signifies dispensing with the task force, but 
not the participation of families in the decision-making processes, such as developing 
the architectural design, the budget and choice of materials and suppliers, paperwork, 
policy-linked activities, etc. In projects where the construction scheme involves a 
global construction contract where small or medium-sized construction companies 
are contracted to fully manage the work, while the movements are left to manage the 
federal government resources and specify the families.
Both cases count on the essential work of technical consultants35, hired by the 
social movements with resources from the program to provide advisory services 
for the projects. They are also in favour of or against self-management, thus the 
moment of hiring either one or another technical consultant is also the time to opt 
for technical questions, as well as political and ideological.
The following maps represent the projects of the Minha Casa Minha Vida 
Entidades Program in the city of São Paulo and the metropolitan region. Map 1 
presents the location, where there is a clear focus in districts located on the east side 
of the city of São Paulo and a conurbation of metropolitan municipalities such as 
Itaquaquecetuba, Guarulhos, Mauá and Diadema. This same map also demonstrates 
the projects selected for examination, and which are located in the east, south and 
north-west of the city, and the metropolitan municipalities of Guarulhos, Suzano 
and Taboão da Serra.
Map 1: Locations of the projects within the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades 
Program in the city of São Paulo and the metropolitan region
35 See note 23.
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Map 2 depicts the projects by the number of residential units. It may be 
observed that the more peripheral projects contain a greater number of housing units. 
Throughout the research, this unequivocal finding was explained by our interlocutors 
as optimization between the demand and the cost of land. In other words, the land, 
although located on the outskirts of the city, was very expensive, and hence could 
not be used for building only a few units. It is clear that the rationale here, although 
legitimate (in terms of demand) is the same as that of the market, i.e. build more to 
offset the costs. It is also for this very same reason that the proposed projects are for 
apartment blocks. Land with projects containing fewer housing units, as is the case 
of Suzano, with 80 single-family residential units, were much less expensive. 
However, it should be stressed that there are other cases of projects with fewer 
housing units that are unrelated to the cost of land. One of the projects studied for the 
research, for example, is located in an area of  ZEIS 4: a Special Zone of Social Interest 
– glebes or land with no buildings in Protected and Watershed Recovery Areas36. In 
this particular case, the watershed in question is the Guarapiranga Reservoir in the 
south of São Paulo. Thus, on the total area of  60,000m² of land only 192 apartments 
will be built. However, there are other projects located in other zones where it is 
permissible to build more housing units on much smaller areas of land.  
There is also one project located in the central area of  São Paulo, which was 
under negotiation while conducting this research and was therefore not included on 
the map. This is a building donated by the Secretariat of State Heritage that is being 
requalified and will contain 120 units. 
Thus, the densification in and around the peripheral regions is not only related 
to the location of projects, but with a combination of other aspects, such as: the cost 
of land, prerogatives of municipal zones, public real estate donations.
Map 2: Projects by number of housing units
36 Strategic Master Plan for 
the city of São Paulo. Lei nº 
16.050, on 31st July 2014. 
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Approval: the relationship with other government spheres
The interchange with leaders and the field work in the projects under construction 
or the planning stages revealed some extremely important aspects not envisaged by 
the document analysis, and the existing literature on the subject. We develop herein 
an analysis regarding the process of project approval, which is demonstrated as being 
the greatest difficulty for the operationalization of the Minha Casa Minha Vida 
Entidades Program. The land issue, although highly complex, was partially resolved 
by obtaining the Advanced Land Purchase instrument, However, the bureaucratic 
issue, promptly adjusted within the relevant legislation and regulations, was not 
sufficient to “unlock” the approvals. 
In all cases examined, the approval of projects by federal, state and local agencies 
is preposterously slow. Not exactly the approvals as such, but rather the time taken.
 In the cases analyzed, the process between identifying the land, presenting the 
Advanced Land Purchase proposal and its effective approval lasted for more than two 
years, with some cases taking up to four years just to approve the Advanced Land 
Purchase.
Social housing movements, after the lengthy process of Advanced Land 
Purchase, need to have the project approved, which basically involves issuing the 
execution permits, environmental licience, the Fire Department’s approval of the 
project, the utility companies for electricity,water and sanitation and the external 
and internal infrastructure project. The moment then arrives when they have to come 
up against their own limits as well as those imposed by the requirements, resistance, 
ignorance, bureaucracy, prejudice and distrust of the “mid-term body”37 represented 
by officials from the departments and technical departments of the three levels of 
government involved in the process.
The commitment theoretically established between the three federal entities for 
implementing the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program in practice is not strong, even 
less so with regards to one modality of the program, the aims of which are far inferior 
to those operated by FAR and the FGTS.
Below we have produced two figures so that readers may visualize the process.
Figure 1: Operational flow of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades Program
Source: Produced by Patricia Maria de Jesus and Danielle de Assis Pinheiro.
37 We are grateful for this 
suggestion provided by 
Luciana O. Royer. 
The inclusion and access  of social housing movemenTs. . .
R ev. BR as. esTud. uRBanos R eg., R ecife, v.18, n.1, p.92-110, Jan.-aBR. 20161 0 6
Figure 1 presents the operational flow of the Entidades modality, from the 
presentation of the CEF projects through to approval of the resources for the Advance 
Land Purchase. It also demonstrates the comings and goings of the stages between 
the social housing movements and the Caixa Econômica Federal. We should herein 
emphasize the fairly frequent complaint among leaders and their peers that time and 
energy, essential for improving the important process of forming their grassroots, are 
drained by the endless bureaucracy.
Figure 2: Flowchart of the Preliminary Project within the Minha Casa Minha Vida 
Entidades Program
Source: Produced by Patricia Maria de Jesus and Danielle de Assis Pinheiro.
Figure 2 was produced after we confirmed the absence in the brochures, 
newsletters and Caixa Econômica Federal and Ministry of Cities manuals of a 
process emphatically described by those we interviewed during this analysis as the 
“Pre-Phase 1”. Nevertheless, understanding it, besides resolving many questions, also 
revealed the limitations and bias involved in producing this material, since they only 
presented the Advanced Land Purchase and Phase 1 (preparation and approval of 
projects) and 2 (contracting the construction), as if there were nothing beforehand. 
They also only include the stages between the Entidades Organizadoras and the federal 
government, thus disregarding the procedures between these groups and other levels 
of government, including the city councils and state government bodies.
On observation of the figure we may observe how approval of a project within 
the Entidades modality of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program functions. We would 
state that with the exception of certain cases, depending on the characteristics of the 
land, the size of the project, the building scheme, etc., a project may be exempt from 
approval in a particular department/specific organ. We therefore consider the figure 
as an “average” example of what needs to be approved by all of them. 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The fact that the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program contained a specific modality 
intended for non-profit entities would appear to suggest that within its formulation, 
there should have been a place for the social housing movements, represented by 
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the four national entities. However, we defend the thesis herein that not only is this 
untrue, but also that the existence of this modality only became accepted through 
the relentless pressure of that particular group, which did not necessarily signify that 
it saw many of its demands attended, since we have seen that the modality is a set 
of adaptations for a program originally produced for another public, with divergent 
interests to its own. In addition, the non-profit entities within the program make up 
a myriad of organizations which are also quite diverse, and not always aligned with 
the proposals of the social housing movements, i.e., the four national entities only 
demanded a fraction of the program that would attend them. But this portion of the 
program that attended them (and other housing movements), also serves groups and 
organizations often unrelated to the discussion and that they insist on guiding.
For these same reasons, the self-management emphatically defended by the 
social housing movements in the past, and held as a foundational argument for the 
demands of the Entidades  modality is no consensus for its operationalization, not 
even among some of the social housing movements, perhaps among other types of 
Entidades Organizadoras. And thus it is that one of the construction schemes accepted 
by Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades is the global construction contract, in which 
a construction company takes responsibility for all the work, while the Entidade 
Organizadora is left to designate the group of beneficiary families and administrate 
the resources passed on to them by the federal government. 
Thus, on examining the projects of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Entidades 
Program in São Paulo, and the metropolitan municipalities of Suzano, Guarulhos 
and Taboão da Serra there are “honourable”38 experiences as well as “dishonourable” 
experiences. In the dishonourable experiences, the houses do not necessarily possess 
the quality heralded and desired by the social housing movements. Furthermore, the 
distortion of the concept of self-management brings into question the justification 
for the existence of the modality (based on the participation and organization of the 
beneficiary families throughout all the processes). The achievement of these groups is 
undermined when compared to “real estate” or when certain construction companies 
act as “surrogates” from some movements to access the resouces of the program. 
However, the honourable experiences should not be viewed as exceptions. It is 
necessary for their true potential to be seen and therefore, that they become widely 
disseminated, discussed and also improved. There are many positive points, among 
which the quality of the housing units (better, larger and cheaper than those produced 
by the construction companies) is just one, but which synthesizes many others: the 
full participation of the beneficiary families in the processes (from the preparation 
of the project through to the construction work), the freedom to propose, develop, 
select and manage projects appropriate to their needs, the knowledge and penetration 
of/into institutional spaces that potentialize the improvement of the political life of 
the people involved, the cooperation with all the surrounding elements of the projetcs 
so as to fulfil the pre-estabished demands in these locations and any future problems 
that will arise because of the project.
[...] The MCMV-E represented gains for the entities in terms of human, material and 
symbolic resources. In certain cases, the regular influx of resources allowed the entities 
to contract professionals to work alongside volunteer frameworks, as well as to expand 
the organizational repertoire when inserting entities into a management logic, which 
38 In reference to the 
expression by Chico de 
Oliveira used by Rizek et al. 
(2014).
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implied a broadening of the range of actors with whom they necessarily had to dialogue 
and negotiate. For some, this has resulted in a rich learning curve (TATAGIBA, 2015, p. 
17, author’s translation). 
 In other words, this concerns the effective achievement of homeownership, 
“although not only that,” through the actions of the social housing movements 
within such an unfavorable environment as the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program. 
Ultimately, this concerns the articulation of the working classes within this 
environment of dispute, and how it is possible to transform it (albeit with many 
obstacles) and appropriate it. For this reason, it is not acceptable to “relinquish” the 
modality, or “succumb” to its weaknesses, contradictions, limits. On the contrary, 
it is necessary to insist on it; although on its own this is not enough. It is imperative 
that the complex relationship between these groups and the bureaucracy be changed 
and improved.
With regard to the land issue, in our view, there is no Advanced Land 
Purchase that may solve (in fact) the issue of access to land, since the existence of 
the instrument does not exempt the social housing movements from competing for 
the land (in absolutely unequal conditions) on the market, with the construction 
companies. Only appropriate policies for reserving areas within the urban fabric of 
the municipalities for the construction of social housing can change the perversity of 
this logic. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that access to land has been 
a problem for centuries in Brazilian society and not of the Entidades modality, but 
the fact that this modality is an appendix of PMCMV without a proper design that 
promotes the production of self-management potentiates the problem still further.
Finally, it will be down to the question of whether the Entidades modality of the 
Minha Casa Minha Vida Program is not in fact a real possibility for expanding the 
limits of this public policy, in which popular groups participate within it not only as 
beneficiaries, but as its proponents and implementers. However, in order for this to 
occur, their proposals should not be heeded by policymakers at some future date, but 
should rather be a presupposed part of it, committed and without prejudice.
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